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Abstract 
Negative rhetoric and policy regarding Muslims has been justified according to a perceived lack of 
integration into British society. However, this lack of integration has not been empirically 
established and remains poorly described. This paper explores whether there are variations in levels 
of ‘Britishness’ and perceptions of the compatibility between Britishness and other 
cultural/religious identities among different minoritised groups in England and Wales. It examines 
the impact of racialisation and other forms of social and economic exclusion on ideas of 
Britishness, focussing on similarities and differences in a sense of access to forms of Britishness 
among migrant groups. Descriptive and multivariate analyses of Citizenship Survey data showed 
that 90% of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Christians felt part of Britain. Muslims were more likely 
than Caribbean Christians to report a strong British identification and (along with Hindus and 
Sikhs) to recognise potential compatibility between this and other aspects of national identity. The 
strength of this feeling was associated with age, gender, generation and, importantly, risk of racist 
victimisation. Greater recognition must be given to the impact of social exclusion on the ability of 
ethnic and religious minority groups to feel part of British society, and also to the strong claim to 
Britishness made by Muslim people in England. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Britishness, Muslim, ethnicity, religion, racialization, exclusion, identity, generation, 
migration, racism   
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Ethnic and religious differences in the attitudes of people towards being ‘British’. 
 
Introduction 
“We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which [young Muslim men] feel they want to 
belong…And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And [this]… can 
lead…[to]… a process of radicalisation….[A] genuinely liberal country…says to its 
citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in those things….At 
stake are not just lives, it is our way of life” (Cameron 2011) 
 
Discussions regarding the problematic ‘loyalty’ of Muslims living in Britain to ‘British’ ways 
of life –as evidenced by the above quotation from David Cameron, the British Prime Minister 
at the time of writing, but present in many other government and media discourses (Cantle 
2001, DCLG 2012, Nash 2012, Uberoi et al 2011) – surfaced during the ‘Rushdie Affair’ in 
1989, but have gained considerable force since the riots in northern England and the terrorist 
incidents on and since 2001 and the associated ‘war(s) on terror’. The emergency legislation 
introduced since this time has served to define an entire population of Muslims in Britain as 
illiberal, ignorant and fanatical, perpetual semi-citizens unable and unwilling to resolve the 
(assumed) inherent contradictions of their commitments to Islamic and British lifestyles 
(McGhee 2008, Parekh 2006). These policies and associated debates have been argued to 
‘decivilise’ Muslim lifestyles and identities, in contrast to the secular and civilised lifestyles of 
the ‘majority’ (Vertigans 2010, Mennell 2007, Runnymede Trust 1997, Meer and Modood 
2009). These discussions have also sought to lay the blame for these incidents entirely on these 
apparent cultural inadequacies, ignoring the role that other factors might play: 
“Now, I’m not saying that these issues of poverty and grievance about foreign policy are 
not important…[but these] are just contributory factors. Even if we sorted [them] out… 
there would still be this terrorism” (Cameron 2011)   
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However this is a conclusion based on extremely limited empirical evidence, a situation which 
is only beginning to be rectified (Karlsen and Nazroo 2010, 2013, Maxwell 2006, 2009, Nandi 
and Platt 2013, Reeskens and Wright 2013). This paper adds to this growing evidence base by 
quantitatively examining the extent to which there are ethnic/religious differences in a sense of 
Britishness and the possible drivers of these variations.  
 
It also explores the relationships between perceived access to forms of Britishness and 
perceptions of racist victimisation, socioeconomic exclusion and migration effects, to help 
provide a better understanding of the potential impact of social processes of exclusion on 
access to national identities. A unique contribution to these debates offered by this work is the 
investigation of the extent to which people with minority backgrounds believe?? it possible to 
belong to Britain whilst maintaining separate cultural and religious identities, the presence of 
ethnic/religious differences in this belief, and the extent to which this belief is affected by 
forms of social and economic exclusion.   
 
Religious affiliation has been found to be an important aspect of personal identity for many 
people: when asked about their ethnic background, many respondents choose to label 
themselves as a member of a religiously identified group (Modood et al 1994, Thomas and 
Sanderson 2011). Religion may operate in a number of disparate ways to motivate group 
identity and cohesion, and social and political mobilisation (Kinnvall 2001; Ecklund 2005), and 
may be associated with lifestyles or beliefs that can contradict or enable co-existence with 
national or other identities. The assumption, which can be identified in media and political 
rhetoric, that the presence of particular religious lifestyles necessarily prohibits access to other 
forms of social identity  therefore appears overly simplistic. That said, the negotiation inherent 
in identity development may act to restrict as well as open access to any particular label 
(Jenkins 2008).  
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Work exploring processes of social identification emphasises the importance of both internal 
and external processes of affiliation (Bourdieu 1977, Weber 1978, Jenkins 1997, Karlsen 2004, 
2006, Karlsen and Nazroo 2002). So while religious customs may offer particular opportunities 
for the maintenance of internal ties, the social and economic exclusion experienced by Muslims 
(Peach 2006, Khattab 2009, Karlsen and Nazroo 2010), and debates such as those outlined 
above, may also have a significant impact on their perception of the extent to which particular 
affiliations and labels, such as ‘British’, may be open to and appropriate for them. Indeed, 
rather than current debates simply seeking to clarify a pre-existing Britishness accessible to all, 
there is evidence that ‘Britishness’ has in fact been reinvented in direct response to this 
perceived ‘Muslim threat’ leading to an exaggeration of the sense of incompatibility between 
Islamic and British identities (McGhee 2008).  
 
Hussain and Bagguley discuss the ways in which British Muslims have been “’securitized’, becoming 
increasingly viewed as a threat by politicians, the media and many non-Muslims” (2012:715). Nickels et al 
(2010) argue that this securitization is based on a construction of Muslims as constituting an existential threat 
to Britishness. As a consequence, their identities (and, where necessary, Britishness) have been reconstructed 
by governments, the media and subsequently the wider public to emphasise this disjuncture (Hussain and 
Bagguley 2012, McGhee 2008). Attention is drawn to the cultural idiosyncrasies of and danger inherent in 
Islam, and the refusal of Muslims in Britain to ‘integrate’ to British morals and lifestyles, which in turn 
contributes to a sense of othering and exclusion among Muslims in Britain (Hussain and Bagguley 2012, 
McGhee 2008). So while consecutive British governments have demanded the adherence of, particularly 
Muslim, communities to a rebranded Britishness (Parekh 2006), and supposedly “fundamental British 
values” (DCLG 2012:17), “life … and principles” (DCLG 2012:11) ‘Britishness’ may actually have become 
something which can no longer be claimed by British Muslims in the same ways as it may for other religious 
groups. 
  
Possibly as a direct consequence of this negative rhetoric from politicians and the media  
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(Kundnani 2008) there have been shifts in the patterning of experiences of racial harassment and 
discrimination. There are variations in the experience of harassment and discrimination between 
religious groups, over and above that which might be ‘explained’ by ethnic affiliation (Weller et al 
2001; Ferguson et al 2009), with Muslims repeatedly described as the social group most frequently 
discriminated against. Karlsen and Nazroo (2014) found that Muslims were more likely to report 
experience of racially or religiously motivated victimization than Caribbean Christians in 2009, 
despite being less likely to do so in 2000. Opinion poll evidence suggests that anti-Muslim 
sentiment was higher at the time these data were collected (2009) than in the 1980s (Bleich 2009). 
Around a quarter of respondents to an ICM (2008) poll, reported in Hussain and Bagguley (2012), 
felt ‘hostile’ towards Muslims. Moreover, a third of respondents felt that Islamic and British values 
were incompatible, while over half felt that Islam was at least partly to blame for the bombings in 
London in July 2005. There is also evidence that prejudice against Muslims (as well as Gay and 
Lesbian people) is considered more socially acceptable than that against any other group (Abrams 
and Houston 2006), although other groups, such as refugees and asylum seekers may also be a 
particular focus of racism (Garner 2010, McGhee 2005). 
 
The ‘Prevent’ strategy (one of the four principle strands of the CONTEST strategy (HM 
Government 2009)), Terrorism Act (2006) and Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001) 
have been singled out as creating a climate of fear among Muslims in Britain (McGhee 2010, 
Downard and Hinsliff 2004), “construct[ing] all Muslims as potential extremist/enemies unless 
proven differently and .. render[ing] their human rights, citizenship and right to remain in 
Britain conditional” (McGhee 2008:49). Whilst there is also some evidence for capacity 
building stemming from these policies (see for example, O’Toole et al 2013), this situation, 
combined with the failure to respond in any significant way to  the links between extremism 
and victimisation, social exclusion, poverty and British foreign policy, has encouraged a 
perception among Muslim groups that they are being unfairly treated, stereotyped and socially 
excluded (McGhee 2008). This, in turn contributes to  a sense of persecution, alienation and 
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victimisation. Individuals for whom religion previously bore no relevance, then, may find it an 
important source of social as well as personal identity as their identities become racialised.  
While it may be argued that the presence and meaning of Britishness has always been quietly 
assumed (Billig 1995) , the existence and nature of Britishness has only recently acquired a 
more prominent place in the nation’s imagining, at least among the ethnic majority, as might be 
implied by Cameron’s comments above. And despite this rhetoric, it has been argued that it 
remains “too contested as an identity to be a source of unity” (Sales 2012:49). Definitions are 
complicated both by the lack of a clear sense of what it means to be a British citizen – with 
markers typically located in simplistic allusions to landscape or previous successes in industry, 
colonialism/imperialism, military action or football (Karlsen 2006, Clarke and Garner 2010) – 
and by the presence of its multiple nations, whose populations relate to the label in differing 
ways. Solutions to the ‘Britishness’ question have tended to appropriate an ‘English’ model 
(Bechhofer and McCrone 2007, CMEB 2000) and in the past ‘the English’ held sufficient 
economic and political power to prevent more explicit acknowledgement of this becoming 
necessary. Indeed  even mention of ‘Britishness’ may be considered racist and essentially 
‘unBritish’ (Clarke and Garner 2010), as was noted by Michael Gove MP in 20071. It is 
interesting that, even with the recent rebranding described above, white British people are less 
likely to describe themselves as British than those living in Britain with ethnic minority 
backgrounds (Nandi and Platt 2013, Jivraj 2013). 
 
Devolution, globalization, European integration and immigration have all recently drawn 
attention to the ambiguous nature of definitions of Britishness – and to the obsolete nature of 
many of the definitional markers previously ascribed to (Sales 2012). Discussions regarding 
the meaning of ‘Britishness’ gained momentum under the New Labour governments of Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown, but the “promotion of Britishness [during and since this time] has 
been ambivalent and contradictory” (Sales 2012:49). Brown, who Nairn (2006) describes as the 
                                                 
1 http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/insearchofbritishvalues1#.U5bqfigVWM_ 
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“bard of Britishness”, proposed a Britishness which offered opportunities for social cohesion 
around common values, . Cameron, however, has sought to revert to ideas of Britishness based 
on particular representations of history, including a celebration of “institutions that define 
Britishness such as our monarchy, our armed forces, and our parliament” (Cameron 2009), 
which reasserts a picture of Britain as superior, successful and dominating. For example, the 
“fundamental British values” articulated in the Prevent strategy and feeding into other aspects 
of policy, include “democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect, and 
tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs” (DfE 2012:5) Interestingly, the values 
which have been appropriated by various governments and at various times to be inherently 
British – patriotism, tolerance, fairness, liberalism and support for equality and democratic and 
legal processes.2 – are universal “ideals to which anyone could aspire” (Winder 2007:32).   
Indeed, evidence from the Citizenship Survey suggests that, with the exception of patriotism, 
people with ethnic minority backgrounds, including Muslims, largely share these civic values 
and are more likely to subscribe to values of equality than the ethnic majority in Britain (Heath 
et al 2010).  
 
Evidence from a survey conducted in 2000 and early 2001 (prior to the terrorist bombings 
bombings in the US in that year and the change in rhetoric relating to Muslims occurring after this 
incident), suggested that at least two-thirds of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs thought of themselves as 
in some way ‘British’ (Karlsen and Nazroo 2010), and were no less likely to think of themselves as 
British than Caribbean Christians. For these respondents, this ‘Britishness’ did not imply a need to 
adopt a particular lifestyle to reflect this, nor did it seem to conflict with a sense of the importance 
of maintaining a cultural way of life that reflected other social identities. However, those who were 
exposed to forms of social and economic marginalisation – particularly those who were not 
employed nor studying, or who reported a perception of an inherent racism in British society – 
                                                 
2 http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2006/12/8/blair-warns-of-duty-to-integrate; 
http://sheikyermami.com/baroness-warsi-lectures-brits-on-britishness/ 
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were less likely to report identifying with a sense of Britishness than others (Karlsen and Nazroo 
2010).  
 
 
In this paper we seek to investigate whether the proportions of people reporting a sense of 
belonging to Britain changed in the ten years following this first study and to examine in more 
detail influences on this sense of belonging. It could be hypothesised that the tension inherent in the 
current situation may encourage many Muslims to draw greater distinction between themselves and 
any Britishness than those involved in the earlier study. However, Hussain and Bagguley (2005) 
argue that, in fact, the current political mobilisation of young Pakistani Muslims in Britain is in 
response to their awareness that their social and economic exclusion and negative treatment 
violates their rights as British citizens, rather than a result of their links with a ‘fanatical’ Islam:  
For the younger generation, their British citizenship is central to their self-understandings and 
assertions of who they are … They are expressing and defending a British multicultural, multi-
ethnic citizenship identity.             (Hussain and Bagguley 2005:411, authors’ italics). 
Similarly, the ‘Britishness’ of Geaves’ group of young Bangladeshi women “rose to the fore only 
in the context of their feeling that their nation of birth provided them with a right to be Muslims 
and publicly express their democratic right to oppose government policy” (Geaves 2005:75). 
 
The starting point for this work is necessarily that the relationships between respondents and their 
Britishness (and therefore the meaning of that Britishness) varies. We do not, therefore, assume a 
particular definition of Britishness to which all respondents subscribe, although this work does 
require that respondents recognise that ‘Britishness’ is a form of identity accessible to some 
people, . Indeed, part of the value of the paper lies in its ability to examine and explicitly identify 
particular dimensions of minoritised ethnic/religious group membership that are influential in the 
context of recognition of this Britishness, using a set of quantitatively-identifiable indicators drawn 
from wider quantitative and qualitative literature describing processes of ethnic and other identity 
construction. Importantly, this enables us to explore heterogeneity in the broad ethnic/religious 
 10 
categories we study, rather than homogenising them, enabling us to see beyond the boundaries of 
broad essentialising ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ categories. This work does not assume that 
ethnic/religious variations exist, nor that any that do are driven by factors that might be considered 
inherently ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’. While we recognise that the meaning of any British, or other, 
social identity – and indeed several of the other terms used in the questions which form the focus of 
these analyses – will vary across individuals and groups, the focus of this work is on people’s 
ability to claim a Britishness, and what influences this. Importantly, this work does not adopt a 
‘Moreno’-style approach, which could be considered to pit one identity against another (Bechhofer 
and McCrone 2010, Moreno 2006). There is no requirement, therefore, for an individual’s ‘British’ 
affiliations (as far as they may exist) to be at the expense of any other.  
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Methods 
This paper explores influences on thinking of yourself as ‘British’ and attitudes towards cultural 
integration among people with different ethnicities and religions in England and Wales. It involves 
secondary analysis of quantitative data collected using face-to-face interviews, as part of the 
2008/2009 Home Office Citizenship Survey (HOCS) (Lloyd 2010). The HOCS survey consists of a 
core sample of 10,000 adults living in England and Wales and a boosted sample of 4,000 people 
with ethnic minority backgrounds and is designed to be representative of the wider population 
living in England and Wales at that time. Multistage probability sampling is used to select for 
inclusion: primary sampling units (PSUs), addresses, up to three households per address and one 
adult (aged 16 or older) per household. Census Area Statistics wards were used as PSUs. For the 
core sample, 663 PSUs were randomly selected and stratified by: government office regions; the 
proportion of the population from each ethnic minority group; and households headed by people in 
non-manual and manual occupations and those including unemployed males. For the ethnic 
minority boost sample, 699 PSUs were randomly selected for screening. These included the same 
high and medium ethnic density PSUs as for the core sample, plus an additional 150 PSUs of high 
ethnic density. If any household member at a screened address was from an ethnic minority group, 
one was randomly selected for inclusion. Data are weighted to allow for the complex sampling 
strategy employed.  
 
The unweighted samples for these analyses are: Caribbean (N=888), African (N=816) and Asian 
Christian (N=212); Indian Hindu (N=794); Indian Sikh (N=339); Indian (N=254), Pakistani 
(N=968), Bangladeshi (N=345) and African Muslim (N=204). 41% (87) of people in the Asian 
Christian group described themselves as having ‘Indian’ ethnicity, 38% (81) described themselves 
as have an ‘other Asian or Asian British background’, 18% (38) had a mixed white and Asian 
ethnic background and 3% (6) reported a Pakistani ethnicity. There were too few respondents with 
no religious affiliation for this group to be included. Place of birth information has been 
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dichotomised to reflect those born in the UK and those not. Economic activity is classified: 
‘employed’, ‘unemployed’, ‘unemployed due to sickness’, ‘retired’ and ‘looking after the home’.  
 
Respondents were asked whether they felt they would experience discrimination in their 
interactions with 16 organisations associated with the provision of services relating to health (a 
local doctors’ surgery, a local hospital, the health service in general), housing (a council housing 
department or housing association, a private landlord), education (a local school, the education 
system in general), criminal justice (the magistrates or crown courts, the crown prosecution service, 
the local police, the police in general, the prison service and the probation service), a local council 
and immigration authorities. Between 24% and 36% of people in these ethnic/religious groups 
reported a sense of risk of being treated worse than people of other races by at least one institution. 
 
Analysis 
We conducted multivariate analyses to investigate the impact of ethnicity/religion, age, gender, 
place of birth and different markers of social and economic exclusion on whether respondents said 
they ‘very strongly belong to Britain’ and whether they strongly agreed that: 
 I personally feel a part of British society 
 It is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity 
 
Logistic regression analyses were used to investigate associations between the likelihood of giving 
a positive response to the different indicators of Britishness and age, gender, ethnic/religious group, 
economic activity, place of birth and perceived risk of institutional racism. This method calculates 
the risk of a positive response associated with each outcome category for each measure, after 
taking account of the effects associated with the other variables included in the model. The findings 
are presented in table 2, using odds ratios. For each variable, the odds of each category are 
calculated relative to those of a ‘comparison’ category, whose risk is set at 1.00, with the exception 
of the measure of age where, as a continuous variable, the odds refer to the risk associated with 
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being a particular age compared with those a year younger. The comparison category can be 
identified in table 2.  
 
Additional analyses were conducted to explore variations between Muslim and non-Muslim 
groups. This approach involved repeating the logistic regression analyses twice: once (only) on the 
sample defining themselves as Muslim (regardless of ethnic background) and again for those who 
did not. The ethnicity/religion variable was not included in these models. Additional analyses were 
also conducted to explore the impact of household income (rather than economic activity) and 
alternative indicators of experience or perceptions of risk of racist victimisation. 
 
The statistically significant nature of each variation is established using the 95% confidence 
interval, presented in table 2 in brackets after each odds ratio, which allows for the sampling effects 
operating on the analysis. Assuming a normally distributed sample, we can assume that 95% of the 
population would have odds within the range provided by the confidence interval. A statistically 
significant variation is one where the upper and lower limits of the confidence interval do not 
incorporate 1.00 (and therefore do not include the odds of the comparison category). These models 
only include those who responded to each of the questions included. The slight variation in the 
bases – the number of people included in each analysis – is explained by variations in the numbers 
of people answering the questions on aspects of British identity.  
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Findings 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the variables included in the logistic regression models, by 
ethnic/religious group.  Only a small minority of respondents did not agree with the statements 
exploring feeling part of Britain, having a very strong sense of belonging to Britain and the 
compatibility of this Britishness with other cultural or religious identities (table 1). Fewer than one 
in eight respondents in each of the ethnic/religious groups explored tended to, or strongly, 
disagree(d) with the statement that they personally felt part of Britain, and between four and zero 
per cent strongly disagreed in each ethnic/religious group. Similarly, between five and zero per 
cent of respondents in each ethnic/religious group reported that they felt they did ‘not at all 
strongly’ belong to Britain. 18% of Asian Christians, 16% of African Christians and 11% or fewer 
respondents in the other ethnic/religious groups explored said they felt they belonged to Britain, but 
‘not very strongly’. 12% of Bangladeshi Muslims, 11% of Caribbean Christians, 7% of African 
Christians and three per cent of or fewer respondents in other groups strongly disagreed that it was 
possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity. 21% of 
Caribbean Christians, 14% of Asian Christians, 12% of Bangladeshi and African Muslims, 11% of 
Indian Hindus and fewer than one in ten Pakistani and Indian Muslims and Indian Sikhs ‘tended to 
disagree’ with this statement.  
 
Table 2 shows results from the logistic regression models predicting responses to the three 
outcomes and enables us to identify the effects of specific variables after adjusting for the effects of 
the other variables included in the models.  Once the effects of age, gender, generation, economic 
activity and perceived risk of institutional discrimination had been taken into account, Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani Muslims were significantly more likely to strongly agree that they personally felt part 
of Britain than Caribbean Christians, with odds ratios of 1.72 and 1.33 respectively, and confidence 
intervals which did not include 1.00. There were no statistically significant variations between 
Caribbean Christians and any of the other ethnic/religious groups included, in terms of their 
likelihood of agreeing that they personally felt part of Britain. However, the odds of Indian 
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Muslims agreeing that they personally felt part of Britain was the same as that for Pakistani 
Muslims, suggesting that it was the small numbers of Indian Muslims in the sample which 
prevented this variation reaching statistical significance.  
 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims were also significantly more likely than Caribbean Christians 
to feel that they very strongly belonged to Britain (with odds ratios of 1.72 and 1.57 respectively 
and confidence intervals which did not include 1.00). There were no statistically significant 
differences in responses to this statement between Caribbean Christians and any of the other 
ethnic/religious groups included after adjusting for variations in age, gender, generation, economic 
activity and perceived risk of institutional discrimination between the groups, although, again, 
additional sample power may have revealed significant variations between Indian Muslim and 
Sikh, and Caribbean Christian, respondents. African Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and Bangladeshi, 
Pakistani, Indian and African Muslims were all significantly more likely than Caribbean Christians 
to strongly agree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or 
religious identity. Indian Muslims were 3.5 times (Odds Ratios (OR) 3.53: 95% confidence interval 
(CI) 2.36-5.26) and Pakistani Muslims were 2.5 times (OR 2.57: 95% CI 1.96-3.37) as likely as 
Caribbean Christians to strongly agree with this statement.  
 
Older people were significantly more likely to report that they very strongly belonged to Britain 
and to strongly agree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or 
religious identity than younger people. The lower limit of the confidence interval for agreeing that 
it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity is 1.00, 
however, indicating that the variation in the odds between consecutive ages has borderline 
statistical significance, but that the small number of people at any particular age prevents these 
variations reaching statistical significance. Additional analysis suggested this variation was driven 
by variations in the attitudes of older and younger Muslims. While older Muslims were 
significantly more likely than younger Muslims to report that they strongly belonged to Britain 
(OR 1.05: 95% CI 1.01-1.10)  and to agree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain 
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separate cultural and religious identities (OR 1.06: 95% CI 1.01-1.11), the association for non-
Muslim groups was not significant (OR 1.01: 95% CI 0.97-1.04 and OR 1.03: 95% CI 0.99-1.07, 
respectively.) Women were less likely to strongly feel part of Britain than men (OR 0.80: 95% CI 
0.68-0.94). This variation was significant for both Muslim (OR 0.75, 95% CI 0.57-1.00) and non-
Muslim (OR 0.79, 95% CI 0.66-0.97) groups.  
 
There was some variation in economic activity/inactivity by ethnic/religious group (table 1). 
However, these did not translate into statistically significant variation in response to any of the 
‘Britishness’ measures examined between people in different forms of economic inactivity and 
those who were employed (table 2). We also investigated the effects of respondent income on these 
associations (details not shown). Models identified no significant income effect on any of the 
indicators of Britishness explored here. Those who were unemployed due to sickness were more 
likely to strongly agree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural 
or religious identity compared with those who were employed (OR 1.42: 95% CI 1.01-1.99).  
 
Fewer than half (47%) of Caribbean Christians had not been born in the UK, compared with 56% 
of Indian Sikhs, 60% of Pakistani Muslims, 74% of Indian Muslims, 75% of Bangladeshi Muslims, 
76% of Indian Hindus, 81% of African Christians, 84% of Asian Christians and 91% of African 
Muslims (table 1). The odds (and confidence intervals) of strongly agreeing both that they 
personally felt part of Britain (OR 0.79, 95% CI 0.66,0.96) and that they very strongly belonged to 
Britain (OR 0.75, 95% CI 0.62,0.91) were below 1.00 for those not born in the UK, indicating that 
they were significantly less likely to agree with these statements, compared with those who had 
been born in the UK (table 2). The confidence interval for the variation in the likelihood of strongly 
agreeing that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious 
identity between those born in or outside of the UK did include 1.00, however, and therefore this 
variation is not statistically significant. But, additional analysis indicated an overlap between the 
effects of age and generation in this model. The odds of strongly agreeing that it is possible to fully 
belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity were significantly higher 
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among those not born in the UK (OR 1.23: 95% CI 1.02, 1.48) compared with those who were, 
when age was excluded from the model. The effects on age of excluding country of birth from this 
model were marginal (OR 1.03: 95% CI 1.00-1.05). Further analysis also suggested that the impact 
of place of birth on these markers varied between Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Among those 
who were born outside of the UK, non-Muslims  were:  
 significantly less likely to personally feel part of Britain (Non-Muslim OR 0.70: 95% CI 0.56-
0.88; Muslim OR 0.89: 95% CI 0.66-1.21); and 
 significantly more likely to report that it is possible to belong to Britain and maintain separate 
cultural and religious identities (Non-Muslim OR 1.33: 95% CI 1.05-1.68; Muslim OR 0.94: 
95% CI 0.69-1.28) than Muslims.  
Non-Muslims born outside of the UK were also significantly less likely to feel that they strongly 
belonged to Britain than Muslims born outside of the UK (Non-Muslim OR 0.73: 95% CI 0.58-
0.91; Muslim OR 0.77: 95% CI 0.57-1.04). However, the similarity in the odd ratios between these 
groups suggest that the lack of significance amongst the Muslim groups may be driven by small 
numbers of people in this group, rather than real differences between these Muslim and non-
Muslim populations.   
 
Almost half (49%) of Caribbean Christians reported perceiving themselves to be at risk of 
institutional racism, compared with 40% of African Christians, between 32% and 35% of Muslims, 
and between 24% and 29% of Indian Hindus, Indian Sikhs and Asian Christians (table 1). Those 
who perceived themselves to be at risk of institutional discrimination were significantly less likely 
to strongly agree that they personally felt part of Britain (OR 0.63: 95% CI 0.53,0.74) and that they 
very strongly belonged to Britain (OR 0.58: 95% CI 0.49,0.68), compared with those who did not 
(table 2). There was no significant variation between those who did or did not perceive a risk of 
institutional discrimination in terms of the likelihood of them strongly agreeing that it is possible to 
fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity, as the confidence 
interval includes 1.00 (OR 0.90: 95% CI 0.76-1.07). We also investigated the effects of additional 
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measures of victimisation on these associations. Responses to a question asking whether 
respondents had experienced verbal harassment and threats, physical attacks or property damage 
‘because of your skin colour, ethnic origin or religion in the last two years’ also had no significant 
association with any of the indicators of Britishness explored here. However, those reporting 
racism to be a ‘very or fairly big’ problem in their local area were significantly less likely to report 
feeling that they very strongly belonged to Britain (OR 0.66: 95% CI 0.54,0.82) compared with 
those who did not.  
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Discussion 
 
The paper seeks to explore whether there are variations in levels of ‘Britishness’ and perceptions of 
the compatibility between Britishness and other cultural/religious identities among different 
minoritised groups, and statistical ‘explanations’ for these, and offers novel insight into the drivers 
of variations in these sentiments. It examines the impact of racism and other forms of social and 
economic exclusion on ideas of Britishness, focussing on similarities and differences in a sense of 
access to forms of Britishness among groups that have what would appear to be similar 
relationships to their country of residence.  
 
This work suggests that there are, indeed, differences in the attitudes of people with different 
ethnicities and religions towards their lives in Britain. However, the picture we present contrasts 
sharply with that painted by current media and policy debates in the UK, Europe and elsewhere. 
Rather than exposing Muslim communities in Britain as a hotbed of anti-British radicalism and 
separatism, this work shows that not only do a large majority of people from the minority groups 
explored consider themselves part of Britain – with almost everyone in each of the ethnic/religious 
groups explored agreeing that they personally felt part of Britain – this sense of belonging is 
stronger among some Muslim groups than those with other religious backgrounds. Such findings 
expose the straw men manufactured by Governments and policy commentators to justify related 
policies and the impact such policies have had on the lives of Muslim populations in the UK and 
elsewhere.  
 
Moreover, many Muslims, and those with other minority ethnicities and religions, do not see a 
contradiction between being British and maintaining a separate cultural or religious identity. These 
findings are supported by other work which has identified a positive association between Muslim 
affiliation and positive national identities (Thomas and Sanderson 2011) and also between British 
identification and higher religiosity (Güveli and Platt 2011, Foner and Alba 2008, Manning and 
Roy 2010). Indeed, Hussain and Bagguley (2005) argue that the young Muslims interviewed in 
their study used a concept of British national identity to expressly accommodate a potential for 
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multiple identities as a form of hybridised ethnic and religious expression, which enabled the 
juxtaposition of strong identities as British citizens and the celebration of ethnic, cultural and 
religious difference. Our findings therefore contradict the belief held more widely in Britain, and 
elsewhere, that religious, especially Islamic, traditions are necessarily anti-British, such that greater 
integration can only be achieved with the loss of minority traditions (Dunn et al 2007; Khiabany 
and Williamson 2008; Miles and Brown 2003; Richardson 2004). The potential for hybridisation 
and flexibility that is present in these forms of Britishness (a potential which is not similarly 
perceived in ‘Englishness’ by the way (Thomas and Sanderson 2011)) may not be recognised in the 
rebranded ‘Britishness’ that has been the focus of Government rhetoric more recently (Cameron 
2011, DCLG 2012, Parekh 2006). 
 
The “politicization of Muslim disloyalty” (McGhee 2008:30), described earlier, does not then 
appear to have impacted significantly on the attitudes of Muslims in Britain towards their sense of 
Britishness. They are not less likely to report feeling ‘British’ than those with other religions, nor 
compared with British Muslims surveyed by us in 2000/early 2001. Then 75% of Indian, 71% of 
Bangladeshi and 70% of Pakistani Muslims and 65% of Hindus and Sikhs said that they felt 
themselves to be in some way British (Karlsen and Nazroo 2010). Over 80% of respondents in 
these groups also felt it important that their cultural way of life be preserved. While Bangladeshi 
Muslims and Indian Sikhs in 2000/01 were less likely than Caribbean Christians to think of 
themselves as British, this was explained by generational variations between the groups. If 
anything, this sense of being part of Britain appears to have strengthened since this time: with 
around 90% of people in different Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Christian groups reporting feeling part 
of Britain and at least 78% reporting this sense of belonging to be fairly or very strong. The strong 
sense of the compatibility between religious/cultural identities reflecting heritage and British 
identities also persists.  
 
These findings support other work that highlights the importance of considering the heterogeneity 
underlying ‘ethnic’ background (Brown 2000), and the need to avoid assumptions regarding the 
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suitability of ‘ethnicity’ as an adequate proxy for socio-demographic, socioeconomic, religious and 
other influences on individual lives. It is unclear why on average women may not feel part of 
Britain as strongly as men. It could be argued that the lower rates of economic activity (and greater 
likelihood of ‘looking after the home’) among women in certain ethnic/religious groups may act to 
prevent a sense of inclusion in British society, particularly if combined with ethnically/religiously 
specific residence patterns. However, the models control for this, and additional analyses suggested 
that despite particularly high rates of non-employment among Muslim women, this variation is 
significant for both non-Muslim and Muslim groups, which does not support such assertions. 
Instead it is  worth considering the particular positions in which societal perceptions of ethnic and 
religious minorities place women, where they are cast as the living embodiment of the peculiarities 
and pathologies of their ‘group’: for example, as Black Caribbean lone mothers, the Asian/Muslim 
hijab-wearing helpless victims of forced marriage, domestic violence and repression (Brah 1992, 
Rattansi 1992, Ray 2005), or, perhaps, stubborn cultural outsiders (Meer et al 2010, Ryan 2012), or 
African victims of female genital mutilation. While research has exposed the varying political 
motives underlying, for example, hijab wearing/non-wearing, it also describes the on-going 
justification these decisions require (see, for example, Ryan 2012). Definitional flexibility and 
consequent access to a claim to Britishness may be particularly problematic for those considered, 
and reacted to as, representatives of particular minoritised identities, where women and their 
behaviour become ‘policed’ as symbolic boundary markers of ethnic, racial or religious 
collectivities (see e.g. Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989, SBS 1990, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 1992, 
Ray 2005). 
 
Once country of birth had been accounted for, older people were more likely to consider 
themselves to very strongly belong to Britain, and that Britishness could be compatible with other 
cultural and religious identities. Additional analyses of the data used here suggested that the 
significant relationships between age and indicators of Britishness were apparent only among 
Muslim groups. This shift may highlight the particular impact that exclusionary dialogues and 
actions have had on younger people, and draws attention to the implications of the specific gaze 
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that has focused on young Muslims more recently (Alexander 2004; Hussain and Bagguley 2005; 
McGhee 2008). This finding is also supported by work, based on the 2003 HOCS, which suggests 
that there has been a growth in the number of young people who identify as Muslim who do not 
have practising Muslim family backgrounds (Scourfield et al 2012) and may reflect the role of 
religion as a focus for political organisation among the socially and economically excluded.  
 
Place of birth had a significant influence on perceived access to British identities in our analysis of 
2000/2001 data and remains so here. But, in contrast to other work (Hussain and Bagguley 2005; 
Karlsen and Nazroo 2013), additional analyses suggested that for some indicators these 
associations varied between Muslims and non-Muslim groups, with non-Muslims born outside of 
the UK less likely to personally feel part of Britain and more likely to report the potential for a 
sense of British belonging to coexist alongside other cultural and religious identities. These 
findings might support a simple integration hypothesis, whereby longer residence encourages 
higher levels of positive national identification (Manning and Roy 2010). It may also be tied to the 
opportunities offered, for some, by citizenship (Karlsen and Nazroo 2013). A European birthplace 
may enable those with minority religions and ethnicities to distance themselves from their 
(geographically defined) ‘ethnic’ identities and assert their right to British (and other European) 
labels (Jacobson 1992, Parekh 2006). One explanation for any Muslim/non-Muslim variation in the 
findings may be that Muslims do not perceive birthplace as producing the same restrictions on 
social integration, as a consequence of a perception of their place in a global Muslim  community, 
or Ummah. Interestingly, given the rhetoric which singles Muslims out as particularly insular, such 
explanations could suggest that Muslim identities may be considered as integrating rather than 
excluding, and more so than non-Muslim ones. Alternatively, it may be that the access to British 
identities offered by a British birthplace to non-Muslim groups is not similarly conveyed to 
Muslims, as suggested above.  
 
We have also explored whether markers of different aspects of racist victimisation – to the extent 
that they may be disentangled – may vary in their impact on a sense of Britishness. Perceptions of 
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institutional racism and of the scale of victimisation in the local area had a strong and significant 
association with a sense of Britishness, although reported recent, direct and personal experience of 
racist verbal or physical assault did not. Discrimination has been shown to occur in almost every 
facet of public and private life – from the ‘daily hassles’ experienced when going about one’s 
normal life to major events, such as being the victim of a racist, or religiously motivated, physical 
attack (Williams et al 2003, Karlsen and Nazroo 2006, 2014). Importantly, studies have also 
suggested that racism need not be experienced personally for it to produce a sense of threat, 
interpersonal incidents being viewed as “an attack on the community as a whole” (Virdee 
1995:284) and that such a sense of fear impacts on wellbeing (Karlsen and Nazroo 2004). The 
significance of perceptions of institutional racism in these models speaks to the importance of 
including more general measures in investigations of national, ethnic and religious identity. These 
findings support other empirical evidence identifying the impact of racist victimisation on a sense 
of positive attachment to British identity (Maxwell 2009) and other national European identities 
(Karlsen and Nazroo 2013) and offer a notable addition to the evidence exploring the impact that 
racist victimisation has on people’s lives, and sense of who they are (Karlsen and Nazroo 2002; 
Karlsen 2004, 2006). 
 
It is important to recognise that the HOCS is a policy survey, and designed in an attempt to 
contribute to particular political debates. One of the many strengths of the survey is in its non-
prescriptive approach, which offers to respondents an undefined notion of ‘Britishness’ that they 
can interpret however they choose. The question regarding the perceived compatibility of 
Britishness and other cultural or religious identities, for example, is posed in the abstract. It does 
not ask respondents about their personal position, nor of the inter-relationships between their own 
particular social identities, but whether they can perceive a potential for Britishness to conflict with 
other cultural and religious identities. It is this flexibility that makes this analysis valuable, 
interesting, and even possible. However, with these data we cannot directly interrogate the ways in 
which people construct and use British, and other, identities and how this varies across (sub-
)groups and contexts. 
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Importantly, we explore similarities and differences in a sense of access to forms of Britishness 
among groups with (what would on the surface appear to be) similar relationships to their country 
of residence. This offers novel insight into the drivers of variations in these sentiments, recognising 
that “what it means to be British for a White person may be radically different from the 
‘Britishness’ experienced by someone who belongs to a minority group” (Hussain and Bagguley 
2005:415). This sample offers us the opportunity to explore both religious commonalities and 
differences within ethnicities and ethnic commonalities, and differences within religions, 
examining Caribbean, African and Asian Christians, Indian Hindus, Indian Sikhs, and Muslims 
with African, Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani heritage and moving us towards an improved 
understanding of the position and attitudes of different ethnic and religious groups in Britain. It 
also allows us to identify commonalities in the impact of experiences of social and economic 
exclusion and migration effects across these ethnic/religious categories. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify explicitly the drivers of any ethnic/religious 
difference in attitudes to Britishness: such as whether any reduced sense of Britishness among 
Muslims in England, for example, is caused by the cultural separation that concerns our 
politicians/media, or by political/media reactions to these concerns. But a key finding of this work, 
which supports other work in this limited area (Nandi and Platt 2013, Jivraj 2013, Heath and 
Demireva 2014), is a lack of the ethnic/religious difference assumed by these debates. We can only 
explore the presence of statistical associations between the particular measures included in the 
analysis, and cannot state definitively from this the processes underpinning the associations we 
find. But we are able to provide conclusive empirical evidence that contradicts the discourses 
which deny the potential compatibility between different cultural/religious identities and 
Britishness and that shows the impact of forms of social exclusion on access to a British identity. 
As well as making a novel contribution to this limited field, the value offered by this quantitative 
nationally-representative data lies in its ability to identify the extent to which this work might be 
generalised to different ethnic/religious groups in Britain. These findings suggest that these 
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relationships are robust, and offer the best hope of effectively refuting the position taken by 
Cameron (2011) and others that Britishness is not a consideration for Muslims, and that poverty 
and social exclusion can be considered unrelated to considerations of Britishness among people 
with ethnic/religious minority backgrounds.  
 
Conclusion 
The strong sense of affiliation to Britain that was present among people with different ethnicities 
and religions in 2000/early 2001 remains evident in 2008/2009. It therefore appears that this sense 
of belonging has not been detrimentally affected by the terrorist incidents occurring since 2001 and 
the responses to them. However, the next ten years may be crucial in shaping alienation from a 
British identity. Indeed, we show that the marginalisation faced by some groups, identified here as 
different forms of racially and religiously motivated victimisation, has a significant association 
with their ability to access a sense of Britishness and the potential for this Britishness to be 
maintained alongside other ethnic/cultural/religious. Rather than focussing on possible negative 
consequences of the maintenance of cultural traditions for social integration, we should be more 
mindful of the effects of this marginalisation on our local communities. Recent UK government 
documents appear to be beginning to recognise the need to respond to these effects, though still 
without taking responsibility for the role of government in the generation of these circumstances 
(DCLG 2012). It will be interesting to see whether these good intentions go far enough to make a 
difference. 
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Table I: Differences in the attitudes towards being ‘British’ and cultural integration among those 
with different ethnic and religious affiliations  
Per cents 
Ethnic group Caribbean African Asian Indian Indian Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi African 
Faith group Christian Christian Christian Hindu Sikh Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim 
To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of Britain?     
Strongly agree 45 41 45 47 51 51 50 56 
37 
Tend to agree 48 49 43 45 47 42 45 38 
50 
Tend to disagree 
5 7 9 6 2 5 4 5 
8 
Strongly disagree 
2 3 3 2 0 2 1 1 
4 
Unweighted bases 
871 803 211 779 337 251 955 339 
195 
        
How strongly do you belong to Britain?        
Very strongly 42 40 38 41 48 45 48 49 
32 
Fairly strongly 44 40 41 47 44 45 43 39 
53 
Not very strongly 
11 16 18 10 7 7 8 9 
10 
Not at all strongly 
4 3 3 2 1 3 1 2 
5 
Unweighted bases 
874 809 211 788 337 252 961 345 
200 
        
To what extent do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong 
to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity? 
     
Strongly agree 25 32 31 39 36 54 45 36 
38 
Tend to agree 43 49 51 47 56 38 42 40 
48 
Tend to disagree 
21 12 14 11 6 5 9 12 
12 
Strongly disagree 
11 7 3 3 2 3 3 12 
2 
Unweighted bases 
843 780 203 752 322 238 934 327 
190 
        
 38 
Mean age 43.5 35.5 40.9 39.3 39.5 37.5 35.1 34.2 
34.3 
Unweighted bases 
888 816 212 793 339 254 968 345 
204 
        
Gender:      
Male 43 54 44 61 51 58 57 61 
41 
Female 57 46 56 39 49 42 43 39 
59 
Unweighted bases 
888 816 212 793 339 254 968 345 
204 
        
Economic activity      
Employed 64 81 72 76 72 65 61 60 
58 
Unemployed 10 9 9 6 8 9 9 12 
13 
Sick 3 1 1 3 6 3 5 5 
3 
Retired 17 2 9 9 8 4 6 5 
1 
Looking after 
home 6 7 9 6 7 17 19 18 
25 
Unweighted bases 
883 812 212 793 338 254 964 344 
204 
        
Not born in UK 47 81 84 76 56 74 60 75 
91 
Unweighted bases 
885 812 212 794 339 254 967 345 
202 
        
Believes they would 
be the victim of 
institutional racism 
49 40 29 24 27 33 33 35 
 
 
32 
Unweighted bases 
888 816 212 794 339 254 968 345 
204 
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Table II: The impact of socio-demographic, socioeconomic and migration characteristics and racist 
victimisation on the odds of thinking of yourself as British, and your attitudes towards cultural 
integration among those with different ethnicities and religions 
 
 Strongly agrees that they  
feel part of Britain  
Feels that they very strongly  
belong to Britain  
Strongly agrees that it is possible to fully 
belong to Britain and maintain a separate 
cultural or religious identity  
Age 1.02 (0.99,1.04) 1.04 (1.01,1.06) 1.02 (1.00,1.05) 
    
Gender:    
Male 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Female 0.80 (0.68,0.94) 0.96 (0.82,1.13) 1.05 (0.89,1.24) 
    
Ethnic/religious group:    
Caribbean Christian 1.00 1.00 1.00 
African Christian 0.92 (0.69,1.21) 1.20 (0.90,1.60) 1.44 (1.07,1.94) 
Asian Christian 1.02 (0.70,1.49) 0.90 (0.61,1.32) 1.31 (0.87,1.96) 
Hindu 1.06 (0.91,1.38) 1.03 (0.79,1.34) 1.86 (1.40,2.47) 
Sikh 1.22 (0.88,1.70) 1.32 (0.95,1.84) 1.69 (1.18,2.42) 
Indian Muslim 1.33 (0.91,1.94) 1.31 (0.89,1.92) 3.53 (2.36,5.26) 
Bangladeshi Muslim 1.72 (1.23,2.40) 1.77 (1.26,2.47) 1.72 (1.19,2.49) 
Pakistani Muslim 1.33 (1.04,1.72) 1.57 (1.22,2.03) 2.57 (1.96,3.37) 
African Muslim 0.82 (0.53,1.27) 0.89 (0.57,1.38) 1.93 (1.25,2.96) 
    
Economic activity:    
Employed 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Unemployed 0.98 (0.74,1.29) 1.15 (0.88,1.49) 0.98 (0.73,1.32) 
Sick 0.96 (0.69,1.34) 1.04 (0.74,1.46) 1.42 (1.01,1.99) 
Retired 0.85 (0.58,1.25) 1.02 (0.69,1.50) 1.00 (0.68,1.49) 
Looking after home 0.89 (0.70,1.13) 1.00 (0.79,1.27) 0.97 (0.77,1.23) 
    
Place of birth:    
Born in UK 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Born elsewhere 0.79 (0.66,0.96) 0.75 (0.62,0.91) 1.12 (0.92,1.37) 
    
Believes they would be the victim of institutional racism   
No 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 40 
Yes 0.63 (0.53,0.74) 0.58 (0.49,0.68) 0.90 (0.76,1.07) 
Unweighted bases 4716 4750 4576 
 
